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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Veigh Cummings, the appellant and cross-respondent, has failed to marshall the 
evidence in the record which supports the District Court's decision, as he was required to 
do. Instead, Cummings has extracted those portions of the record favorable to him and has 
re-argued that same evidence on appeal, while asserting his own credibility and giving 
himself the benefit of every inference from the evidence he has chosen. Since Cummings 
has failed to marshall the evidence in either his principal brief or his reply brief, the Court 
of Appeals should consider the factual findings of the District Court to be correct and 
should simply review for correctness the legal conclusions of the trial court. 
As a matter of law, the district court was correct in concluding that malice was 
implied from Cummings' conduct; that the Gillmors are entitled to damages in the form 
of attorneys' fees for slander of their title; that Cummings is not entitled to a set-off for 
amounts paid by other defendants in settlement; and, that Cummings' claims of adverse 
possession and slander of title were properly dismissed. 
Cummings has failed to show, from evidence in the record, support for the trial 
court's determination to award the Gillmors only half of their attorneys' fees as damages 
consequent to Cummings' slander of their title. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CUMMINGS HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHALL THE 
EVIDENCE. 
In his reply brief, Cummings repeatedly asserts that he has marshalled the evidence 
and that the evidence shows the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. It is plain that 
Cummings fundamentally misconstrues the nature of the marshalling requirement. 
In Utah, a party challenging the trial court's findings of fact "faces a substantial 
appellate burden." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). As the trier of fact, the district court's findings are reviewed under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard, Alta Ind., Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993), and 
a finding is only "clearly erroneous" if it is against the great weight of the evidence or if the 
reviewing court is "definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
To make such a showing, an appellant is first required to marshall the evidence, that 
is, to "present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City, 
818 P.2d at 1315. Once all the evidence supporting the decision of the trial court has been 
so marshalled, the appellant must "demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence' thus 
making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), 
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quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Where the appellant has not 
adequately marshalled the evidence, the trial court's findings will be presumed to be correct 
and its decision will be affirmed. See, ejj., Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (1991). 
In this case, instead of concisely stating the marshalled evidence, Cummings merely 
quotes large blocks of transcribed testimony. Further, in both his brief-in-chief and his 
reply brief, Cummings has simply lifted from the record those isolated bits and pieces of 
the evidence supporting his position. These, he presents with the positive inferences and 
superior credibility which he presents to himself — which the District Court chose not to 
afford him -- and re-argues to this Court the same case he lost below. 
This is precisely what the appellant attempted to do in Commercial Union Assoc, 
v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), where this Court observed: "This tactic 
ignores the burden that [appellant] must carry to properly challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact." As it did in Commercial Union, this Court should assume that all of the 
trial court's factual findings are supported by the record and consider the issues Cummings 
raises as questions of law alone. Id. at 36, f.n. 5. 
POINT H 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW CLEAR ERROR. 
The one-sided "marshalling" of the evidence Cummings presents in his briefs ignores 
the burden an appellant bears, as discussed in Point I above. Cummings persists in re-
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arguing the evidence he presented below, insisting that the trial court should have found 
different facts than it did. Such an offering on appeal is insufficient. 
For example, as regards the Gillmors' slander of title claim, a key element of the 
Gillmors' cause of action is malice. In his briefs, Cummings holds forth his own testimony-
that when he hired Parley Neeley to survey the property Cummings had purchased from 
Emil and Bernice Marcellin, he recalls that Mr. Neeley was given a copy of a deed or a tax 
notice containing a description of the property. (R. 1509). Cummings asserts that his own 
testimony on this point is "undisputed", (Appellant's Reply Brief at 11), and demonstrates 
an absence of malice. It is apparent, however, that the trial court did not believe 
Cummings' testimony on this point. The trial court was not obligated to believe Cummings' 
testimony, and substantial evidence supports its decision. 
In like fashion, Cummings attempts to re-argue the evidence concerning whether Old 
Ranch Road was moved after the deed to the parties' grantors. It is true that Cummings 
produced a number of witnesses to rebut evidence that Old Ranch Road had been re-
aligned by the WPA in the early 1930's. However, the trial court chose to believe the 
testimony of Frank Marcellin, a neutral witness who grew up on the property and actually 
saw the WPA crews move the road. The district court was under no obligation to find 
Cummings' witnesses more credible nor to give greater weight to the evidence Cummings 
introduced: 
See, Appellees' Brief, pp. 19-21. 
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When acting as the fact-finder, the trial court is entitled to assess the 
witnesses and to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences 
therefrom. 
Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 
(1994). Due regard must be given to the trial court's opportunity to observe and judge the 
credibility of the witnesses, Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), and 
it is free to disbelieve their testimony. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
A disagreement with how the trial court weighed certain evidence against other 
evidence is not a showing that the decision which was reached was "clearly erroneous", 
unless the decision "is against the great weight of evidence or if the court is otherwise 
definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful, 784 P.2d at 1175. 
That cannot be the case here, where substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision 
to quiet title in the Gillmors and to award them damages for slander of title. 
POINT ffl 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE GILLMORS 
ONLY HALF THEIR DEMONSTRATED DAMAGES. 
Cummings' response to the Gillmors' cross-appeal concerning the district court's 
award of damages contends that no damages should have been awarded in the first place 
because Cummings denies that "malice" was proven at trial. However, as discussed in Point 
II, above, Cummings has failed to show "clear error" concerning the elements of slander of 
title. 
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In Point V of his Reply Brief, Cummings argues that even if this Court affirms the 
finding of malice, 
. . . then other elements of the cases [sic] should be reviewed: 
1. Gillmors had three sets of attorneys on the cases at various 
times, [sic] 
2. An appeal from a Summary Judgment which was awarded 
to the other defendant in which Cummings did not take an 
active role in. 
3. An off-set to the amount already received by the Gillmors 
in excess of the fair market value of the property in dispute 
should be applied towards attorney's fees award. 
(Appellants' Reply Brief, at 16). 
While it is correct that the Gillmors' present counsel is their third in the case, 
Cummings introduced no evidence that this multiplied the attorneys' fees they necessarily 
incurred. Mr. Athay testified that extra work necessitated by a change of counsel was "at 
most three hours." (R. 1939). 
As to the prior appeal, Cummings' assertion is correct. However, that intermediate 
appeal was taken by parties to whom Cummings had sold portions of the subject property, 
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or their successors. Those parties would not have had an interest in the subject property 
in the first place - and the Gillmors would not have had to sue them -- if Cummings had 
not sold property which did not belong to him in the first place. For Cummings to now say 
Those defendants have since settled with the Gillmors and are no longer parties to this action. 
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that he has nothing to do with the fees of litigating with the other defendants in this case 
is disingenuous. 
Cummings has not challenged the basic thrust of the Gillmors' cross-appeal, that the 
district court arbitrarily and without reliance on evidence in the record, reduced the 
attorneys' fees awarded the Gillmors as a result of being required to bring this action to 
vindicate their ownership of the subject property. For the district court to have done so, 
it must rely on evidence and articulate its reasoning. It did neither, and the judgment 
should be reversed in this respect. 
CONCLUSION 
Cummings has failed to marshall the evidence. Substantial evidence supports the 
trial court's findings to which Cummings addresses his appeal. Those findings should be 
affirmed. 
The trial court improperly halved the Gillmors' damages in the form of attorneys' 
fees. No evidence supports this ruling, which this Court should reverse. 
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